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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSENT TO OR WAIvER OF DELAY-WHETHER A
DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WAIVES THE STATUTORY RIGHT
TO BE TRIED WITHIN FOUR MONTHS OF ARREST BY ENTERING A PLEA OF
GUILTY AFTER THE FOUR-MONTH PERIOD HAS ELAPsE--The effect of a plea
of guilty on a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial' was recon-
1 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9.
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sidered recently in the case of People v. DeCola.2  The defendant, under
indictment on two charges of burglary and one of grand larceny, had been
imprisoned continuously without bail after his arrest, which took place
more than four months before the cases were finally scheduled for trial.
The defendant had not been responsible for any of the delay which pre-
ceded his trial.3 On the date of the trial, the defendant filed a written
motion for discharge in each count on the ground that he had been de-
prived of his right to a speedy trial in that he had not been tried within
the four month period required by statute.4  The motion for discharge
was overruled; the defendant was tried on one burglary charge and found
guilty. The following day, he pleaded guilty to the other two charges
and was sentenced by the trial court on all three counts. The defendant
appealed directly5 to the Supreme Court of Illinois which reversed the
judgment on the first count of burglary, but affirmed the judgments of
conviction on the two charges to which the defendant had pleaded guilty
after holding that the defendant, by his plea of guilty, had waived his
right to speedy trial.
While the application of this statute has been in issue in previous
cases, in the instant case it was the sole issue. Prior Illinois decisions
indicate confusion both in the intended purpose of the statute and in the
strictness with which it is to be applied. Although it has been interpreted
by some courts as an extension of the general constitutional provision
which guarantees the right to a speedy trial and therefore held to be
absolute in its scope and application,6 acceptance of this interpretation
has steadily diminished, culminating with the decision in the instant case
that a plea of guilty negatives the assumption that there are issues to be
tried and therefore waives the right to a speedy trial. The decision also
pointed out that non-jurisdictional defects are waived by a plea of guilty
and that a speedy trial is not jurisdictional.
2 15 Ill. (2d) 527, 155 N. E. (2d) 622 (1959).
3 The State unsuccessfully contended that by failing to demand an immediate
trial and by requesting a Jury trial, which he ultimately waived, the defendant had
consented to the first continuance.
4 It is provided in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 748, that any person
arrested for a criminal offense, who has not been admitted to bail and has not been
tried within four months from the date of his arrest, shall be discharged, unless
the delay results from the prisoner's own application.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780J, provides that criminal cases above the
grade of misdemeanor shall be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
6 People v. House, 10 Ill. (2d) 556, 141 N. E. (2d) 12 (1957); People v. Still-
wagon, 373 Ill. 211, 25 N. E. (2d) 795 (1940) ; People v. Emblen, 362 fI1. 142, 199
N. E. 281 (1935) ; People v. Schmagien, 361 IlL 371, 198 N. E. 142 (1935) ; People
v. Szobor, 360 Ill. 233, 195 N. E. 648 (1935) ; Newlin v. People, 221 Ill. 166, 77
N. E. 529 (1906).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
The question of whether lapse of the four months period removes a
case from the trial court's jurisdiction was raised in People v. Utterback,7
where the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus on this ground and
several others. It was held that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the person and subject matter and that a writ of habeas corpus cannot
be used to effect the results of a writ of error after a judgment of con-
viction. The defendant had relied upon the earlier case of People v.
Szobor,8 in which it was held that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction
over the defendant. In answer to this contention, the Supreme Court
held that reference in the Szobor case to the trial court's being without
jurisdiction to accept a plea or enter judgment after the expiration
of the four-month period was not necessary to a decision of the case
and that any language in that opinion which so indicated was thereby
overruled.
With regard to the constitutional question raised by the defendant
here, the court held in People v. Hartman,9 that where the question con-
cerns whether there has been a waiver of the statute and deprivation of
constitutional rights, the constitution does not fix the time, and the
statute is only intended to implement the constitutional provisions, but
a violation of the statute or of the procedure under the statute does not
in itself create a constitutional question.
With questions of jurisdiction and constitutionality decided against
the interests of the defendant, the sole issue in this case became that of
whether the defendant waived his statutory right by entering pleas of
guilty after his motion for discharge had been overruled. The court
pointed out that it had previously ruled in the affirmative in People v.
Lantz,10 and in People v. Sweeney,"1 but that in those cases, the issue as
to waiver by a plea of guilty was one of many issues presented as alter-
native grounds of decision.
In holding as it did, the Supreme Court made definite a ruling which
is consistent with views presented by it in a steady line of cases in which
the effect of this statute has been in issue. It is apparent from the
reversal of the judgment of conviction on the first charge, that the court
thought the defendant's motion to be discharged under the statute, made
before the pleas of guilty were entered, was improperly rejected by the
trial court. It would then be difficult to agree that the decision in the
7 3&5 Il1. 239, 52 N. E. (2d) 775 (1944).
8 360 Ill. 233, 195 N. E. 648 (1935).
9 408 Ill. 133, 96 N. E. (2d) 449 (1951).
10 387 Ill. 72, 55 N. E. (2d) 78 (1944).
11409 I1. 223, 99 N. E. (2d) 143 (1951).
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instant case is just, were the harshness of the ruling not somewhat miti-
gated by the fact that, as the court pointed out, a guilty defendant can
now waive indictment, enter a plea of guilty, and begin serving his sen-
tence as soon as he is arrested.
12
The statute, commonly known as the "four term act," was enacted
to implement the constitutional provision for a speedy trial by stating
an arbitrary period during which any prisoner must be tried for his
crime or be discharged. As in cases where a statute of limitations is
applied, the guilt or innocence of the prisoner is not material to proper
execution of the statute, as the statute was enacted to prevent the govern-
ment from unduly harsh treatment of the prisoner and with the knowl-
edge that the guilty as well as the innocent might benefit from its appli-
cation. Even if it be conceded that no constitutional question is involved,
the expiration of the four months period, without the prisoner's having
been brought to trial, places him within the statute and entitles him to
be discharged. Since his guilt or innocence is not material to the statutory
right, it appears to follow that a plea of guilty should not waive the right
even after the period has elapsed.
Miss J. FLEMING
EMINENT DOMAIN-SETTING ASIDE VERDICT AND NEw TRIAn-
WHE JTHER REMITTITUR MAY BE UTILIZED IN A STATUTORY EMINENT DOMAIN
AcTION-In the recent case of Department of Public Works and Building
v. Huff,' the Supreme Court of Illinois considered a question of first im-
pression in Illinois: whether a remittitur was proper in a statutory emi-
nent domain proceeding? The defendants in the eminent domain action
had been awarded damages by a jury. The plaintiff condemnor moved to
vacate the judgment and for a new trial, urging that the verdicts were
beyond the range of the evidence. The trial judge overruled the plain-
tiff's motions on condition that the defendants consent to a remittitur,
which the defendants did. The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of Illinois2 on the ground that the remittitur was improper because
there was no authority for the trial judge's action in either the statutes
concerning eminent domain3 or in the Civil Practice Act.4 That tribunal
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 702. See also, People v. Bradley, 7 II.
(2d) 619, 131 N. E. (2d) 538 (1956).
1 15 Ill. (2d) 517, 155 N. E. (2d) 563 (1959).
2 The opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois did not give the ground of direct
appeal from the trial court. However, the State of Illinois was interested as a
party, through the Department of Public Works and Buildings, which would fur-
nish a ground under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75(1) (b).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 1, et seq.
4 IR. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 1, et seq.
